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THE ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL IN STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: SDI, MAD, AND THE ABM
TREATY
The most significant legal criticism of the Reagan Administration's
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is that it threatens the continued efficacy
of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,
commonly known as the ABM Treaty. 1 This threat manifests itself as an
interpretation of the ABM Treaty by SDI proponents which diverges from
traditional analyses of that document's meaning and intent. The different
interpretation of the Treaty arises from a fundamental disagreement over
what type of nuclear deterrent is best for the United States and its allies.
This disagreement over the appropriate type of deterrent is the source of the
threat to the Treaty, for it questions the Treaty's strategic foundations.
The ABM Treaty incorporates in its statement of purpose the assump-
tions of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).2 MAD seeks to deter nuclear
war through the threat of retaliation. The traditional interpretation of the
Treaty is consistent with this tactic of MAD. Given this common the-
oretical foundation, the conclusion follows naturally that the traditional
interpretation of the Treaty accurately reflects the original, mutual intent of
the signatories. Such a conclusion, however, misses the point of the current
debate over the ABM Treaty. Because the Reagan Administration is disput-
ing the assumptions of MAD which underlie the ABM Treaty, one can
determine the "correct" interpretation of the Treaty only in the broader
context of strategic nuclear doctrine. 3 In this context, the term "correct" is
properly read as "appropriate for strategic purposes." Which interpretation
is "correct" at this basic level, therefore, exists independently from the text
of the Treaty and depends on whether one accepts the Reagan Administra-
tion's viewpoint on deterrence or that of "traditional" supporters of the
doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction.
The underlying doctrinal dispute between the traditional viewpoint and
that of the Reagan Administration is properly understood by recognizing
1. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503
[hereinafter ABM Treaty].
2. The statement of purpose is reproduced in full infra note 17; Strategic Arms Limitation
Agreements: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1972)
(statement of Donald G. Brennan, Senior Fellow, Professional Staff, Hudson Institute) [hereinafter
S.A.L.A.].
3. The strategic nuclear doctrine underlying the ABM Treaty is analogous to the legislative history
of a statute. As such, strategic nuclear doctrine is an appropriate source for the interpretive needs of this
Comment.
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that the competing premises of SDI and MAD are mutually inconsistent as
presented. Because the ABM Treaty incorporates the assumptions of
MAD, it can serve only the latter doctrine. This inconsistency is easily seen
from the fact that SDI is meant to produce a wide range of anti-ballistic
missile systems with varying basing modes, while the ABM Treaty is
intended to prevent, with limited exceptions, the production and deploy-
ment of such weapons.
To resolve the underlying doctrinal dispute, the United States must
choose either to abandon SDI in favor of MAD, or vice versa. This choice is
necessary because, as this Comment demonstrates, the two doctrines
cannot be maintained simultaneously. Once this primary choice is made,
the debate over the interpretation of the ABM Treaty resolves itself into the
secondary question of whether to terminate the Treaty to allow effective
pursuit of SDI, or to reaffirm that treaty to permit continued reliance on the
doctrine of MAD as the basis of our nuclear deterrent. This Comment, after
identifying the competing premises of deterrence, will analyze the methods
to be used and the problems to be overcome in reconciling the Treaty with
whichever strategic doctrine is eventually selected.
I. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DOCTRINE COMPARED:
COMPETING PREMISES OF DETERRENCE
Before a country can seriously negotiate an arms control treaty, it must
devise a comprehensive military strategy which the prospective treaty will
serve. 4 Without such a broad strategy, there is nothing to assist the negotiat-
ing team in determining whether a given proposal aids, harms, or has no
effect whatsoever on the security of its state. To complicate matters, two or
more nations must determine that the final product is in their best interests.5
When the American and Soviet teams commenced negotiations in
Helsinki on November 17, 1969,6 the United States had a coherent, overall
plan, and an anti-ballistic missile treaty had a clear role within it. The
Soviet Union was initially against the idea of restricting defensive develop-
ments in the nuclear arena, but the American delegation convinced the
Soviets that the United States' strategy was actually in the best interests of
4. S.A.L.A., supra note 2, at40 (statement of Senator William B. Spong, Jr.); id. at61 (statement
of Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense); Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 388 (1972) (statements of
Senator Henry M. Jackson and Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Chief Delegate, SALT).
5. S.A.L.A., supra note 2, at 10 (statement of William P. Rogers, Secretary of State); id. at 66
(statement of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Navy, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff).
6. Id. at 4 (statement of William P. Rogers); Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation by the Executive
Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars" Testing and Development, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 857, 858
(1986).
Vol 62:763, 1987
SDI, MAD, and the ABM Treaty
both countries.7 This strategy was and is known as Mutual Assured De-
struction, and without some understanding of its basic principles one
cannot determine the true purpose of the ABM Treaty as it now exists.
A. Mutual Assured Destruction: Nuclear Stalemate
The strategic doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction depends upon
each superpower holding the other country's civilian population hostage to
the threat of nuclear annihilation. 8 For MAD to work, each state must be
able to destroy the other country's society even after suffering a first strike
against its own nuclear delivery systems. Such a retaliatory capability is
essential to the "mutual" deterrent of MAD, for without it the potential
aggressor incurs little or no risk by using nuclear weapons. When faced
with sure retaliation, the theory goes, no country led by sane leaders would
launch a first strike, for there could be no hope of any meaningful victory.
The potential aggressor is, therefore, deterred from beginning nuclear war
and perhaps even conventional conflicts. 9
Under an "undeveloped" doctrine of MAD, it is possible to have
destabilizing weapon deployments which are consistent with a strategy of
assured destruction. To avoid such destabilizing deployments, MAD delin-
eates two additional corollaries. First, a nuclear deterrent consisting of a
mix of offensive and defensive systems produces incentives to launch a first
strike and is therefore destabilizing in a crisis. A country possessing such a
mix of weapon systems might believe it could avoid massive destruction
after launching a first strike by hiding behind a defensive "shield." 10 It
might also conclude that it should preempt its opponent's first strike to
ensure possession of enough warheads to overwhelm that opponent's
defenses." Further, with a mixed force structure the incentives to launch a
first strike intensify as a crisis builds because each side is aware that the
other country has complementary reasons to execute such an attack.
Obviously, a deterrent should produce exactly the opposite effect-that is,
as a crisis intensifies, the incentives to launch a first strike should decrease.
The doctrine of MAD, therefore, rejects as fundamentally unsound a
deterrent force based on both offensive and defensive weapons.
7. S.A.L.A., supra note 2, at 183 (prepared statement of Paul Warnke, Former Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs); id. at 202 (statement of Jerome H. Kahan, Senior Fellow,
Brookings Institution).
8. Id. at 2 (opening statement of SenatorJ.W. Fuibright, Chairman); id. at 191 (statement of Stanley
Hoffman, Professor of Government, Harvard University).
9. Id. at I (opening statement of Senator LW. Fulbright, Chairman).
10. Id. at 269-70 (statement of Senator J.S. Cooper).
11. Id. at 183 (prepared statement of Paul Warnke, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs).
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Second, MAD assumes that a strictly defensive deterrent is inadequate.
This assumption contains two elements. One, any defensive system is
vulnerable to failure or to "saturation" at some level of attack, at which
point offensive weapons will get through. 12 Two, since a purely defensive
strategy does not threaten the aggressor with retaliation, it essentially gives
the aggressor a free shot at destroying its opponent. In short, a strictly
defensive strategy does not deter the potential aggressor from starting a
nuclear war, nor does it provide society with adequate protection from
attack. 13 It basically is no "deterrent" at all.
The proponents of a MAD deterrent rely on the threat of massive
destruction because they find the alternatives to be lacking in one or more
ways. Holding civilian populations hostage to nuclear annihilation is
morally unsatisfactory to many individuals, 14 but it does provide a consis-
tent, overall plan by which the United States can mold its military strategy.
A principal element of this plan is the maintenance by both superpowers of
sufficient nuclear forces with which to retaliate after being attacked.' 5
When viewed in the light of the requirements of this principal element,
defensive systems in the aggressor's arsenal take on a distinctly offensive
character because they limit the defender's ability to retaliate. Thus, one
way to ensure possession of a secure retaliatory force is to limit anti-
ballistic missile systems. It is this end which the ABM Treaty is meant to
achieve.
The ABM Treaty, as a component of the nuclear strategy of Mutual
Assured Destruction, incorporates explicitly in its statement of purpose
some of that doctrine's assumptions. 16 Paragraph three of the statement of
purpose 7 specifies that "effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile
12. For instance, a defensive system that could intercept 100 missiles, even if 100 percent effective,
would fail upon arrival of the 10 1st warhead. Id. at 346 (statement of Marvin L. Goldberger, Chairman,
Department of Physics, Princeton University).
13. The inadequacies of a strictly defensive strategy would exist if the strategy were unilaterally
adopted. Theoretically, if such a strategy were adopted by both the United States and the Soviet Union
with a concurrent destruction of all offensive weapons, the problem of the "potential aggressor" would
disappear. In actuality, however, problems would still remain in verifying the agreement to make sure
no cheating occurred, in deterring third countries with offensive nuclear weapons from attacking either
the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., and in maintaining sufficient conventional forces to deter a Warsaw Pact
attack in Europe.
14. S.A.L.A., supra note 2, at 311 (statement of James Doman, Board of Policy, Liberty Lobby,
and Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, Catholic University).
15. Id. at I (opening statement of Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman).
16. Id. at 187 (statement of Donald G. Brennan, Senior Fellow, Professional Staff, Hudson
Institute).
17. The statement of purpose reads as follows:
[1] The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties,
[2] Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all
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systems . . . would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war
involving nuclear weapons." This is an expression of the assumption that a
mix of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons destabilizes deterrence by
increasing the incentives for a first strike in a crisis. The absence of ABM
systems, therefore, eliminates this particular source of instability. 18
In paragraph three a second assumption is asserted in the corollary "that
effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a sub-
stantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms. "19 MAD
requires that each superpower has sufficient nuclear weapons both to
withstand a first strike and to launch a retaliatory strike. If one superpower
deploys a ballistic missile defense, therefore, the other country may deploy
more offensive warheads to ensure that it will have enough weapons
available with which to retaliate. Conversely, if ABM systems are not
deployed, the corollary stated in paragraph three is reached because these
additional offensive weapons are not needed and the arms race should be
voluntarily "curbed."
Paragraph four of the statement of purpose states that restrictions on anti-
ballistic missile systems would help create more favorable conditions for
further negotiations on limiting strategic arms. 20 Paragraph four concludes
mankind,
[3) Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a
substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the
risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,
[4] Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as
certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute
to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,
[5] Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons,
[6] Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear
arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarma-
ment, and general and complete disarmament,
[7] Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust
between States, Have agreed as follows....
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, at 1 [hereinafter statement of purpose] (numbers in brackets added for
identification purposes). Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
referred to in paragraph five above, states as follows:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839.
18. The acronym "ABM" is used broadly in this Commentto include "conventional" anti-ballistic
missile systems, ballistic missile defenses (BMDs), and any exotic weapon system which can perform
the common task of destroying ballistic missiles in flight.
19. Statement of purpose, supra note 17. This last conclusion is not essential to the success of the
strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction and is best perceived as a potential benefit of the doctrine rather
than a necessary by-product.
20. Id. at para. [4].
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that the ABM Treaty (and SALT I) will generally make it easier for the
superpowers to reach agreement on more restrictive limitations to their
nuclear arsenals because each nation will be confident that its offensive
arms will not be rendered inadequate by a surprise deployment of a ballistic
missile defense system.
B. MAD Rejected: The Strategic Defense Initiative
On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced that the United States
should develop a defensive system capable of destroying nuclear missiles
before they reach United States soil. 21 This idea, which rejects reliance on
offensive weapons to deter nuclear war through the threat of retaliation and
instead suggests the use of defensive weapons as a deterrent, 22 is the
foundation of the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Three assumptions underlying SDI are important to our consideration of
the ABM Treaty. Each assumption is in direct conflict with the doctrine of
MAD. First, SDI proponents reject the traditional view that anti-ballistic
missiles are destabilizing. 23 Instead, they claim that ABMs enhance deter-
rence by protecting retaliatory forces from a first strike, thereby complicat-
ing the task of a successful attack. 24 This effect, it is asserted, stabilizes
deterrence by making an attack less likely to occur.25
Second, proponents of SDI reject the conclusion that limitations on anti-
ballistic missiles create more favorable conditions for further negotiations
on limiting strategic arms. One major criticism leveled at the ABM Treaty
21. President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1983, at
A20, col. 1 (late ed.).
22. Text ofReagan's Broadcast Address on Talks with Gorbachev in Iceland, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14,
1986, at 4, col. 1 (nat'l ed.) [hereinafter Text of Reagan's Broadcast]; The Objectives ofArms Control 7
(Current Policy 677, Department of State) (March 28, 1985) [hereinafter The Objectives of Arms
Control]; and Payne & Pike, SDI and Arms Control: Are They Compatible?, in PROMISE OR PERIL: THE
STRATEGic DEFENSE INmATIVE 329 (Z. Brzezinski ed. 1986). The moral superiority of such a defensive
deterrent is highly persuasive, and this moral aspect clearly had an important influence on President
Reagan's decision to initiate SDI. See Text of Reagan's Broadcast, supra, at 4, col. 1. Of course,
morality alone is not sufficient for a secure deterrent to nuclear war. Rather, the nation's nuclear force
structure must be designed to fulfill specified military purposes aimed at providing a credible and stable
deterrent. The Reagan Administration believes that SDI will provide such a deterrent.
23. When Mr. Gorbachev asserted in Iceland that the SDI program was potentially destabilizing,
President Reagan told an aid; "I don't know why this guy believes this, because it is just not true." In
Iceland: How Grim Ending Followed Hard-Won Gains, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1986, at 5, col. I (nat'l
ed.).
24. The Objectives ofArms Control, supra note 22, at 6; Note, The Legality of President Reagan's
Proposed Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense System, 14 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 329, 338 (1984).
25. Note that an attack would be less likely to occur because the United States would be more likely
to have weapons left with which to retaliate. That is, MAD would be deterring nuclear war. See infra
note 61.
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is that it has conspicuously failed to achieve additional arms limitations.
Proponents of SDI believe that anti-ballistic missiles actually encourage
further arms control limitations. As support for their position, they argue
that it was the mere potential of SDI which overcame Soviet reluctance to
attend arms control talks and brought them to the negotiating table in
Reykjavik in October, 1986.26 Presumably, if the mere potentiality of SDI
could produce such results, the actual deployment of.defensive weapon
systems would be even more efficacious.
Third, SDI proponents assume that the presence, not the absence, of
anti-ballistic missile systems will curb the race in strategic offensive arms.
This assumption is supported by the fact that the gross number of strategic
warheads in the superpowers' arsenals increased significantly since 1972,
when the ABM Treaty forbade deployment of defensive systems outside
the locations specified in the Treaty itself.27
SDI proponents acknowledge, however, that defensive weapons will
curb the arms race only if two conditions are met. The first condition is that
the weapons produced from SDI must be reasonably survivable. 28 Other-
wise, the defensive weapons themselves will be tempting targets for a first
strike, thereby undermining the stability of our deterrent. Second, the
defensive systems must be cost effective at the margin. That is, it must be
cheaper to deploy additional defensive capability than it is for the opponent
26. Text of Reagan's Broadcast, supra note 22, at 4, col. 5. One must wonder, however, if the
Soviets would react differently to the actuality of ABM deployments than they have to the mere threat of
such deployments.
27. In May, 1972, when the SALT Accords were signed, the United States had some 5,700 strategic
warheads and the Soviet Union had approximately 2,500. On January 1, 1981, the United States had
approximately 9,000 strategic warheads and the U.S.S.R. had 7,000. D. HOLLOWAY, THE SovIET
UNION Aim THE ARMS RAcE 59-60 (1983). Note that these numbers account for only "strategic" nuclear
warheads which can be delivered by systems with intercontinental range. "Theater" nuclear weapons,
which have shorter ranges and are based in such areas as West Europe, are not included in these totals.
The issue of whether or not the ABM Treaty is to blame for failing to prevent this increase in the
number of deployed strategic offensive nuclear weapons is still undecided. It is true that the Treaty was
intended to prevent an increase in weapon numbers and that it failed to accomplish that goal. The Treaty,
however, was and could be only one factor in the effort to achieve this end.
Another required factor was the political will not to deploy offensive weapons while the Soviet
response to the ABM Treaty was evaluated. This political will did not exist. Its absence was suspected
by some senators even as the hearings on the Treaty were being held. See generally S.A.L.A., supra note
2 (expressions of concern over the Department of Defense's requests for funding of numerous offensive
weapon systems begin on page one of the record of the hearing and are found throughout the testimony).
Thus, the ABM Treaty may never have had the chance to prevent or restrain the growth of offensive
nuclear weapons.
28. Not only must the defensive weapons themselves survive, but so too must the entire support
structure of those weapons, including detection, tracking, and computing technologies, and the
command and control facilities in charge of activating the defense.
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to add the offensive weapons necessary to overcome the defense. Other-
wise, the defensive systems would lead to an arms race by encouraging the
opponent to produce countermeasures and additional offensive weapons. 29
Assuming that these conditions are met, SDI proponents deduce, the
reasons for a strategic offensive arms race will be eliminated, and any arms
race that does occur will be shifted to the relatively benign sphere of
defensive systems. In such a situation, our nuclear deterrent should be both
stable and effective. 30
C. MAD or SDI: The Necessity of Choice
The assumptions of MAD and SDI stand in sharp contrast to each other.
One obvious conclusion from a comparison of these contrasting premises
is that the prohibition of ABMs serves the purposes of MAD but under-
mines the goals of SDI. There are three possible options for dealing with
this conflict: One, continue the pursuit of SDI while "retaining" the ABM
Treaty; two, withdraw from the Treaty and concentrate our efforts on SDI;
or three, abandon SDI and revise the ABM Treaty to improve its ability to
serve the strategic purposes of MAD.
The Reagan Administration has chosen the first option. Within this
option, the purpose of the Strategic Defense Initiative is to permit an
informed decision, sometime in the 1990's, as to the feasibility of a defense
against ballistic missile attack.31 Given the tentative nature of this objec-
tive, the desire to retain the ABM Treaty as a hedge against failure seems to
make sense. This general approach would theoretically "freeze" options
two and three above until the mid-1990's, at which point the United States
could either renounce anti-ballistic missile systems and SDI and carry on
with MAD and the ABM Treaty, or "pursue a new and very different
approach to arms control" which encourages the deployment of missile
29. The Objectives of Arms Control, supra note 22, at 6. If these "conditions" become inconve-
nient, the Reagan Administration might abandon either or both of them. Indeed, recent information
indicates that, in order to head off political resistance to SDI, the Pentagon plans to speed the
development of satellites armed with interceptor missiles by taking shortcuts in such areas as the
satellites' ability to defend themselves. "Star Wars" Focus of Reagan Meeting, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10,
1987, at 6, col. 1 (nat'l ed.). While the Reagan Administration might be willing to abandon technical
requirements for defensive weapon systems, it is unlikely that the premises underlying SDI can be so
flexible. To avoid an offensive arms race, defensive systems simply must be cost effective at the margin
and unattractive first-strike targets.
30. This assumes that the opponent is also able to deploy an effective defense. If the opponent could
not deploy such a defense, it would have to increase the number of its offensive weapons until it had a
secure retaliatory force, no matter what the economic cost.
31. The Objectives of Arms Control, supra note 22, at 6; see also Payne & Pike, supra note 22, at
329.
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defenses and simultaneous reductions in offensive forces. 32 The former
option would be pursued if the new technologies could not meet the
standards set for them, namely that they be reasonably survivable and cost
effective at the margin.33 If the technologies were successful, however, the
strategic relationship could then be characterized under the latter option as
one of "mutual assured security," premised on the ability to deny success
to a potential attacker.34
Unfortunately, any effort to "freeze" the choice between options two and
three above until the mid-1990's by attempting to pursue them simul-
taneously under option one, as the Reagan Administration is trying to do,
cannot succeed. This effort will fail because the options are based on
contradictory premises about the effects of defensive weapon systems on
deterrence. 35 For example, if the United States pursues development and
testing of defensive weapons beyond the currently permitted levels under
the ABM Treaty 36 to see if effective systems can be produced, the Soviet
Union's protections against a sudden deployment of ABMs by the United
States will be destroyed. As a result of this danger of a "breakout" from the
Treaty, we would have to expect the Soviets to respond by expanding their
own ABM program, and one of the major purposes of the Treaty-the
avoidance of an arms race-would be nullified. 37 Conversely, the ABM
Treaty, whether given a traditional or broad interpretation, cannot help but
restrict research into SDI technology. Such a restriction would conflict with
the best interests of the United States as identified by proponents of the
initiative. In short, by pursuing both options simultaneously, the United
32. Payne & Pike, supra note 22, at 329-30. Assuming that SDI does prove to be feasible, it does
not necessarily follow that the positive strategic effects foreseen by the Reagan Administration will also
occur. See infra note 61.
33. The Objectives of Arms Control, supra note 22, at 6.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. These two options would be especially difficult to maintain simultaneously if the Reagan
Administration adopts a "broad" interpretation of the Treaty allowing testing and development of
exotic weapons technologies.
36. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
37. This arms race would be in response to the deployment of defensive nuclear weapons, and is
thus distinguishable from the current race driven by the deployment of offensive weapons. The new
"defensive" arms race would probably extend to the deployment of both offensive and defensive
systems, because, one, SDI could easily produce new offensive weapons, and two, the deployment of
additional offensive weapons is an effective means for combating a defensive system. The Soviet Union
does appear to be concerned about the possibility of another arms race, as is demonstrated by
Gorbachev's comments in Iceland, where he said that "Moscow could not back down on Mr. Reagan's
program to develop exotic new missile defense technologies because the program threatened to produce
new offensive weapons and to extend the arms race into space." GorbachevAngrilyMakes Charge That
Reagan 'Scuttled' Accords, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1986, at 7, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
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States risks destroying the benefits of each while increasing their respective
costs.
The legal and military implications of these strategic contradictions
require that a choice be made. While it might be technically feasible not to
violate the terms of the ABM Treaty while pursuing SDI, increased
development and testing of defensive systems could not avoid violating the
spirit of the Treaty. This is unacceptable because by the time it could be
determined whether or not SDI worked, the ABM Treaty would be a hollow
shell to which a strategic or legal return would be impossible. In these
circumstances, one path must be chosen and pursued vigorously. Con-
tinuing SDI while paying lip service to MAD is simply not a viable option.
II. ABROGATION: THE "ROLE" OF THE ABM TREATY UNDER
SDI
The only strategically and legally rational resolution to the dilemma
created by a simultaneous pursuit of SDI and MAD, assuming that the
United States continues with the Strategic Defense Initiative, is to with-
draw from the ABM Treaty. To execute this withdrawal successfully, the
United States must fulfill both international and domestic legal obligations
and clear political and technical hurdles to the realization of SDI. While
these obligations and obstacles present some significant difficulties to the
termination of the ABM Treaty, they should be surmountable.
A. Legal Obstacles to Withdrawal from the Treaty Under Article XV
The framework is in place for abandoning MAD and its legal offspring,
the ABM Treaty, and implementing SDI in its stead. Article XV of the
ABM Treaty establishes that the Treaty will be of unlimited duration.
Article XV also provides for withdrawal from the Treaty if "extraordinary
events related to the subject matter" of the Treaty jeopardize the party's
"supreme interests." 38 Notice of the decision to withdraw must be given
six months in advance, and the notice must include a statement of the
extraordinary events the notifying party regards as jeopardizing its supreme
interests. 39
The implementation of the framework for abandoning the Treaty and
MAD would not be trouble free, however. Article XV allows the United
States to withdraw from the Treaty, but certain justifications for withdrawal
may not be sufficient under international law. The issue whether the
38. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. XV(2).
39. Id.
772
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President may act alone or must act in conjunction with Congress for a
termination of the Treaty to be constitutionally valid is also problematic.
1. International Legal Requirements
Article XV of the ABM Treaty differs from termination clauses in some
other treaties in that it does not become effective on the occurrence of some
objective event, like the passage of a specified period of time. Instead, it is
activated by the good-faith determination of subjective events and the
showing of "special cause" by the withdrawing party.4° The "special
cause" which the United States must show under Article XV is that
extraordinary events have jeopardized the United States' supreme inter-
ests. 4
1
Such an "extraordinary event" could be the operation of the large
phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk in the interior of the Soviet Union.
42
Even strong supporters of MAD and the ABM Treaty believe that the likely
purpose of the Krasnoyarsk radar is to give early warning of an attack by
submarine-based U.S. missiles on Soviet missile fields, and that it there-
fore violates the express language of the Treaty. 43 Since large, phased-array
radars are among the longest lead-time indicators of a potential "breakout"
from the ABM Treaty, the conclusion that construction of the Krasnoyarsk
radar represents an extraordinary event would have a good-faith basis.44 As
such, it would meet the United States' international legal obligations for
withdrawal under the specific terms of the ABM Treaty.
45
40. See SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIEs 182 (2d ed. 1984)
(withdrawal language, effectively the same as in the ABM Treaty, is quoted from the Partial Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty).
41. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. XV(2).
42. As support for a withdrawal from the Treaty, the United States could also cite the possible
development of a mobile ABM system, and prohibited, deliberate interference with the reception by the
United States of Soviet test data from their ballistic missiles as required for verification purposes under
Article XII of the ABM Treaty. See Comment, Star Wars Meets the ABM Treaty: The Treaty
Termination Controversy, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 701, 721-22 (1985) [hereinafter Treaty
Termination Controversy].
43. Bundy, Kerman, McNamara & Smith, The President's Choice: Star Wars orArms Control, 63
FoREIGN Arr. 264, 275-76 (1984/85).
44. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares that "Every treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." See THE ViENNA
CON eMON ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, infra note 45; RESTATEmENT (REvisED) OF FOREIGN RELATiONS
LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 321 (Tent. Draft No. 6, vol. 2, 1985) [hereinafter REsTATEmrEr (REvisED)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw], follows this rule, and the comment to § 321 declares that the obligation of
good faith "lies at the core of the law of international agreements and is perhaps the most important
principle of international law." Id. It is thus critical to the United States' withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty under international law that the subjective finding of "extraordinary events" justifying termina-
tion be made on a good faith basis.
45. A major legal instrument for determining the general international obligations of a signatory to
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2. Domestic Legal Requirements
While the United States can withdraw in accordance with the terms of the
ABM Treaty under international law, it remains problematic whether the
President may constitutionally terminate the Treaty on his decision alone or
whether he must seek the consent of Congress.46 This lack of certainty
results from the fact that article II, section 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion deals only with the making of a treaty and not with its subsequent
termination. The absence in the Constitution of an express allocation of
power to terminate a treaty makes it possible to argue that the advice and
consent of the Senate is required both for making and terminating a treaty.
In Goldwater v. Carter, this argument was presented by Senator Barry
Goldwater and twenty-four other members of Congress who sought an
injunction to prevent President Carter from abrogating the mutual defense
treaty between the United States and Taiwan. 47 The plaintiffs' position
prevailed in the district court, but was rejected by the court of appeals,
which held that the President had authority to terminate the treaty without
the concurrence either of the Congress or of the Senate alone. On certiorari,
a splintered Supreme Court dismissed Senator Goldwater's suit, but also
vacated the court of appeal's decision that the President had acted within his
constitutional powers. 48 In short, neither the position of the district court
nor that of the court of appeals received the support of a majority of the
a bilateral or multilateral treaty is the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. See SINCLAIR, supra
note 40, at 1. The Convention itself is reprinted in THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES:
TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 45-57 (1978). The United States has not ratified this Convention. The Vienna
Convention, however, does embody much of customary international law, and in Weinberger v. Rossi,
456 U.S. 25, 29 (1982), the United States Supreme Court cited and followed a Convention rule without
further explanation or authority. The Vienna Convention is, therefore, a convenient benchmark against
which to measure United States behavior. Article 54 of the Convention provides that "[t]he termination
of a treaty or withdrawal of a party may take place. . . in conformity with the provisions of the treaty."
This article of the Convention, acknowledging the validity of such treaty provisions, allows the United
States to proceed directly to Article XV of the ABM Treaty and, given the presence of "extraordinary
events . . . jeopardiz[ing] its supreme interests ... ," provide the requisite notice of withdrawal.
46. Treaty Termination Controversy, supra note 42, at 714.
47. 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
48. The views expressed by the justices of the Supreme Court, within both the majority and
minority, varied considerably. Justice Powell concurred in the result, finding the issue of presidential
authority to terminate treaties to be justiciable, but not ripe because of the absence of a legislative
resolution opposing President Carter's action. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997. Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Stevens, found the controversy to be a nonjusticia-
ble political question. Id. at 1007. Justices Blackmun and White, dissenting, believed that without the
oral argument denied by the Court to the parties, none of the issues of standing, justiciability, ripeness,
and presidential power, could be decided. Id. at 1006. Justice Brennan dissented, saying that he found
the issue justiciable and that he would affirm the court of appeals' ruling upholding the President's
power to act without congressional consent. Id. at 1000. Finally, Justice Marshall concurred in the
result, making the decision six to three, but did not express his own opinion or join one of the others. Id.
at 996.
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Supreme Court because a plurality found the issue to be a nonjusticiable
political question and the remaining five justices were too divided to
produce a result inconsistent with this position.
Goldwater has two important implications for any possible withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty. First, if the "nonjusticiable" position continues to
prevail in the Supreme Court, "a consititutional crisis of profound dimen-
sions" 49 could materialize if the President proceeds to terminate the Treaty
and Congress responds by passing a resolution forbidding such an action.
50
In such a situation, with no "neutral" decision maker available, the Presi-
dent may indeed achieve a de facto abrogation of the ABM Treaty. The
ensuing conflict with Congress over the legality of such an action and the
resulting disruption of the government, however, could effectively under-
mine any attempt to achieve the perceived benefits of withdrawal.
The second relevant implication of Goldwater also arises from a hypo-
thetical constitutional deadlock between the President and Congress. In
Goldwater, Justice Powell, who concurred in the result of the plurality but
disagreed with the finding of nonjusticiability, did not reach the issue of
presidential authority to terminate treaties because in his opinion that issue
was not ripe in the absence of a legislative resolution opposing President
Carter's actions. 51 The hypothetical situation discussed above would, of
course, eliminate the hurdle which prevented Justice Powell from reaching
the merits of the issue and perhaps prove to be sufficient to allow judicial
resolution of the controversy.52
While Goldwater does not provide any clear signals as to how the Court
would rule if it did decide the extent of presidential authority to terminate
treaties, there is other guidance which indicates that the Court should
permit executive abrogation of treaties even in the face of congressional
disapproval. For instance, the United States Supreme Court has held that
the established constitutional authority of the President to conduct the
foreign relations of the United States irfiplicitly carries with it the power to
49. See Senator Warns Reagan Not to Hurry 'Star Wars,' Seattle Times, Feb. 7, 1987, atA6, col.
2, where Senator Nunn said that a unilateral decision to abandon the traditional interpretation of the
Treaty would "provoke a constitutional confrontation of profound dimension." While this remark
relates directly to the interpretation of the Treaty and not to its termination, a similar confrontation
could be expected in the latter circumstances.
50. On May 6, 1987, the House of Representatives approved a measure upholding the traditional
interpretation of the ABM Treaty, intending to restrict the development and testing of SDI to that
reading. House Votes to Limit U.S. Actions Under Two Nuclear-Arms Pacts, Seattle Times, May 7,
1987, at A4, col. 1.
51. 444 U.S. at 997.
52. Treaty Termination Controversy, supra note 42, at 717-18. The subsequent change in the
membership of the Court, including Justice Powell's resignation, adds an additional variable to the
uncertainty of this issue.
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terminate an international agreement. 53 Necessarily, then, the power to
terminate a treaty includes the ability to decide when the treaty no longer
serves the national interest, when it is obsolete, or when another signatory
is in breach. 54 This position is persuasive enough for it to have been adopted
in the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law, 55 and it should have
a similar effect upon the Supreme Court. 56 Therefore, if President Reagan
complies with the procedural requirements of Article XV of the ABM
Treaty and declares the Krasnoyarsk phased-array radar to be a violation
justifying termination, his actions should be an effective termination of the
Treaty under both international and domestic law.57
53. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
54. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 44, § 339, reporter's notes at
157.
55. Id. § 339.
56. In Goldwater, Justice Brennan was the sole judge to reach a conclusion on the merits of the
controversy. He would have affirmed the court of appeals' ruling upholding the President's power to act
without Congressional consent. 444 U.S. 996, 1000 (1979). Important to note, however, is the caveat
that "Congress (not the Senate alone) might claim a voice in the termination of a treaty where
termination might create serious danger of war, in view of the authority of Congress to decide for war or
peace under Article I, section 8, of the Constitution." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW, supra note 44, § 339 comment at 156. Given the ABM Treaty's critical role in the defense of this
country, this aspect of congressional power might prevent the President from terminating the Treaty
without legislative consent.
57. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 44, § 339 comment at
157, (discussion of the technical effect termination has on international and domestic law). The position
taken by the RESTATEMENT is implicitly supported by Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1912). In
Charlton, the appellant, an American citizen charged with murdering his wife in Italy, claimed that an
1868 extradition treaty was void because the Italian government refused to honor its reciprocal
obligation to extradite its own nationals to the United States, stating instead that it would try Italians in
Italy for crimes allegedly committed in America. Secretary of State Knox, while acknowledging this
refusal to be a breach sufficient for abrogation, stated in a memorandum that the treaty remained
binding until formally abrogated, and this the American government refused to do. Id. at 475. The
Supreme Court, noting the government's position, found that:
The Executive Department having thus elected to waive any right to free itself from the obligation
to deliver up its own citizens, it is the plain duty of this court to recognize the obligation to
surrender the appellant as one imposed by the treaty as the supreme law of the land, and as
affording authority for the warrant of extradition.
Id. at 476. By finding that the government had waived its right to abrogate the breached treaty, the Court
implied that the Executive could have unilaterally terminated the treaty if it had so desired. Treaty
Termination Controversy, supra note 42, at 718. This implicit conclusion supports the RESTATEMENT'S
position that the President can terminate treaties without legislative consent.
Another implicit conclusion of the Charlton case is that the United States was not "estopped" from
abrogating the extradition treaty for future cases if it so chose. This is important because the United
States government has not withdrawn from the ABM Treaty even though it has already determined that
the Krasnoyarsk radar violates that agreement. Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
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B. Political Opposition and Technical Pitfalls
Despite the apparent legal feasibility of abrogating the ABM Treaty to
allow the theoretical underpinnings of SDI to be exploited to their fullest, the
Reagan Administration has made no serious moves in that direction. In fact,
President Reagan directed that SDI be carried out in full compliance with the
traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty, 58 although the Administration
now appears to be seriously considering adopting the broad interpretation of
the Treaty's obligations. 59 Part of the Reagan Administration's reluctance to
withdraw from the Treaty is undoubtedly due to the adverse reactions which
would issue from Congress, the public, and the United States' allies. 6°
Additionally, the international and domestic legal requirements for with-
drawal, while probably not insurmountable, are daunting, especially consid-
ering the possibility of lengthy and devisive litigation. These considerations
do not account for all of the Administration's reticence, however, for there is
also the fundamental problem of the feasibility of the Strategic Defense
Initiative itself.61 The possibility of eventual technological failure, the con-
58. The Objectives of Arms Control, supra note 22, at 6.
59. U.S. Said to NearRuling onMeaning of '72 ABM Treaty, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5,1987, at 1, col. 6
(nat'l ed.); Shultz Says Terms ofABM TreatyAllow "Star Wars" Testing, Seattle Times, Feb. 9, 1987, at
A4, col. 1; and "Star Wars" Focus ofReaganMeeting, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10,1987, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
60. Allies Surprised by Plans to Speed "Star Wars" Tests, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1987, at 1, col. I
(nat'l ed.);Senator WarnsReagan Notto Hurry "Star Wars," SeattleTimes, Feb. 7, 1987, atA6, col. 1;
and Disquiet in the Alliance, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.).
61. While a detailed discussion of SDI is beyond the scope of this Comment, a brief discussion of
some of the problems confronting the initiative is in order. First, in a strict technological sense SDI
could fail through an inability to develop or deploy weapon systems capable of destroying offensive
ballistic missiles. For two articles dealing with fundamentally different technological areas of the
initiative, see The Technology of Strategic Defense-Where We Stand And How Far We Can Go: An
Interview with Hans A. Bethe, 10 FLETCHER F. 8 (1986), and Lin, The Development of Software for
Ballistic-Missile Defense, Sci. Am. 46 (Dec. 1985). Obviously, without the weapon systems to back it
up, SDI is an empty facade.
Second, potential technological and theoretical problems merge in the premises of SDI which
depend upon defensive systems performing more effectively than offensive weapons. The premise that
ABM systems will curb the arms race in strategic offensive arms, for instance, is valid only if those
defensive arms are reasonably survivable and cost effective at the margin. (Recall that a defensive
system is cost effective at the margin if, after development, it is cheaper to build and deploy one
additional defensive unit than it is to build and deploy an additional offensive unit.) Otherwise, those
very defensive systems undermine the fundamental purpose of SDI by encouraging a race to deploy
countermeasures and additional offensive weapons.
Third, SDI encounters a serious theoretical difficulty in its premise that ABMs enhance deterrence by
protecting our retaliatory forces from a first strike, thereby complicating the task of an aggressor and
making an attack less likely to occur. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. A moment's
reflection reveals the difficulty with this premise. The defensive systems contemplated by the Reagan
Administration are intended to protect our retaliatory forces. Clausen, The SDIDebate, 10 FLrrcHmE F.
33 (1986). In other words, SDI does not represent a fundamental doctrinal shift, but simply the addition
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cern about world reaction, and the legal hurdles incident to withdrawal
explain the Reagan Administration's continued "observance" of the ABM
Treaty despite the fact that it hinders the pursuit of SDI.
III. THE ABM TREATY REVISED
If SDI is rejected as a theoretical foundation for our nuclear deterrent, the
other viable option is to continue with the doctrine of Mutual Assured
Destruction. To do so, the United States and the Soviet Union would need
to revise the ABM Treaty to remove the interpretative ambiguities identi-
fied in the current debate over that document's meaning. These revisions
would ensure that the Treaty could continue to fulfill its intended strategic
role as defined by the underlying assumptions and conclusions of MAD.
A. Article II
Article II determines the scope of the weapons regulated by the Treaty by
defining the nature of an ABM system. Article II currently reads as follows:
Article II
1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently
consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed
and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for
launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM
role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.
2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article
include those which are:
(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.
of another layer to MAD, for we will still threaten the Soviet Union's civilian population with
destruction if we ourselves are attacked.
Finally, even if SDI worked perfectly for both our land-based missiles and our cities, our country
would remain vulnerable to nuclear attack by cruise missiles, Soviet bombers, and depressed-trajectory
submarine launched ballistic missiles. Given the expense of SDI, the flaws underlying its strategic
premises, and the distinct possibility that its defensive systems would fail, one cannot help but question
the wisdom of the initiative.
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In theory, the ideal content of the definition of an "ABM system" should
be identifiable without even referring to Article II simply by examining
what the prohibition of ABMs is meant to achieve under MAD. Such a
prohibition is intended to ensure the continuation of mutual vulnerability
between the United States and the Soviet Union. 62 Since any type of
weapon system which can destroy a ballistic missile in flight affects this
mutual vulnerability, it stands to reason that all such weapon systems
would fall within the definition of an "ABM."
The bare language of Article II, however, has turned out to be ambigu-
ous. Proponents of SDI read the Article II definition of an ABM system
much more narrowly than do MAD adherents. 63 This difference of opinion
results from varying interpretations of the wording and punctuation in the
article.
The focus of dispute in Article II is the wording "currently consisting
of" found in paragraph one. Supporters of the traditional reading and of the
doctrine of MAD regard this language as being functional in effect, thereby
making the ABM system description in the article illustrative and not
limiting.64 This reading makes all types of ABM systems, no matter what
their technological foundations, subject to the terms of the ABM Treaty.
Thus, when Article V, discussed in more detail below, bans the testing,
development, and deployment of ABM systems other than fixed land-based
systems, 65 it includes "exotic" weapon systems such as particle beam
lasers and other weapons envisioned as part of an SDI system, even though
those exotic weapons are not expressly mentioned in Article II itself. This
conclusion as to the scope of Artricle II and the effect of Article V is
consistent with the requirements of MAD, for if the Treaty's goal is to
62. Paragraph three of the statement of purpose, by claiming that "effective measures to limit anti-
ballistic missile systems. . . would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear
weapons . . . ." reflects the drafters' conclusion that restricting both nations' ability to defend
themselves, i.e., ensuring mutual vulnerability, is the way to deter nuclear attacks. This is consistent
with the assumptions of MAD. Comment, The Legality ofa High-Technology Missile Defense System:
The ABM and Outer Space Treaties, 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 418, 419 (1984).
63. Chayes & Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The
Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. Rv. 1956 (1986); Sofaer, TheABM Treaty and the Strategic
Defense Initiative, 99 HIv. L. REv. 1972 (1986).
64. Chayes, supra note 63, at 1957, 1958. Secretary of State Rogers stated that the enumeration of
components was an illustrative reference to systems currently in use, and not a limitation of the Treaty's
coverage. Id. Similarly, Dr. Raymond Garthoff, the Executive Secretary and a Senior Advisor in the
United States delegation that negotiated the Treaty, wrote that "the word 'currently' was deliberately
inserted into a previously adopted text of Article II at the time agreement was reached on the future
systems ban in order to have the very effect of closing a loophole to the ban on futures in both Articles III
and V (and several others)." Id. at 1959.
65. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. V; see infra note 72 and accompanying text; see also Chayes,
supra note 63, at 1957.
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restrict the deployment of defensive systems, it makes no sense to leave a
loophole for more advanced, more effective, ABM weapons.
In contrast to the traditional, functional reading of Article II, legal
advisers to the Reagan Administration contend that the comma imme-
diately preceeding the phrase "currently consisting of" is conjunctive in
effect. 66 From this interpretation, the Article 11(1) definition of an ABM
system is read to mean a system that serves the functions described and
which consists of the type of components "currently" existing at the time of
the Treaty's signature. This analysis produces a definition of "ABM sys-
tems" which does not include exotic technologies. 67 Indeed, this reading of
Article II limits the scope of that article, and therefore the entire Treaty, to
such an extent that the fundamental purposes of MAD can easily be
frustrated within the framework of a document expressly intended to
further that doctrine's strategy.
The Administration's argument does not rest entirely on the suggested
conjunctive effect of a comma, however. It also depends upon Agreed
Interpretation [D], which is the only place in the Treaty or its appendices
where future types of ABM weapon systems are explicitly discussed. The
statement reads as follows:
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems
and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the
Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical princi-
ples and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor
missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific
limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to
discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with
Article XIV of the Treaty.68
From this agreed interpretation, the administration's legal adviser con-
cludes that the parties anticipated the creation of ABM weapon systems and
components based on other physical principles than those in use in 1972,
that the parties did not agree to restrict necessary research, development,
and testing, and that only deployment was prohibited. 69
66. See infra note 67.
67. Abraham Sofaer, the Legal Adviser from the Department of State, contends that:
The article 11(1) definition can reasonably be read to mean that, for the purposes of the Treaty, an
"ABM system" is one that serves the functions described and that consists of the type of
components that existed "currently" (that is, at the time the treaty was signed). According to this
reading, the parties listed the three components not merely to cite the systems that happened then
to be in use, but also to limit the scope of the article 11(1) definition to ABM systems based on
physical principles then in use.
Sofaer, supra note 63, at 1974.
68. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Agreed Interpretation [D].
69. Sofaer, supra note 63, at 1973. For a concurring opinion on the effect of Agreed Interpretation
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Regardless of which technical reading of Article II the reader finds most
persuasive,70 room for argument does exist. In order for the ABM Treaty to
fulfill its role under the strategic doctrine of MAD, therefore, Article II
must be revised to make it clear that the definition of ABM systems is in fact
illustrative and that the scope of the article and the Treaty as a whole
extends to "exotic" technologies. 71
The following revision would resolve the present ambiguities in Article
II and would help the Treaty to continue limiting ABM weapons effec-
tively.
Article II (Revised)
1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.
2. An ABM system currently consists of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, ...
[D], see Note, supra note 24, at 342. Interestingly, Gerard Smith, Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency during the SALT negotiations, commented that laser technology was known in
1972 and therefore could not be one of those "other physical principles" referred to in Agreed
Interpretation [D]. Remarks by Gerard Smith, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (National Public Radio, Feb.
27, 1987).
70. Article 31, General rule of interpretation, and Article 32, Supplementary means of interpreta-
tion, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties tend to support the traditional analysis of the
ABM Treaty. THE VIENNA CONF nON ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 45. Article 31, paragraph
3(b), for instance, states that an interpretation shall take into account "any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."
71. Revising Article II to provide an illustrative definition of an ABM system may not be sufficient
to ensure that each nation retains the ability to retaliate against the other. To ensure that such mutual
vulnerability continues to exist, consideration should be given to expanding the scope of the ABM
Treaty to include anti-satellite weapons. At first glance, anti-ballistic missile systems and anti-satellite
weapons may not seem to have enough in common to warrant inclusion within the same arms control
treaty. The targets of these systems are cleary distinguishable, and there is much to be said for defining
arms control negotiations as narrowly as possible in order to maximize the chances for success.
"However, although the arms control issues may be distinct, the military technology associated with
them is not. Weapons which could be used against ballistic missiles could also be used against
satellites." F. BLAcKcAY, WORLD ARMAMENrs AND DIs A.~MiAr 10 (1985) (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute). Furthermore,
Anti-satellites are not specifically prohibited by the Treaty. They are permitted under the Treaty so
long as they are not used to interfere with a party's 'national technical means of verification.' [See
Article XII(2)] Distinguishing between [ABM] satellites and anti-satellites using directed energy
technology will be difficult, if not impossible. A party may exploit this gap by orbiting satellites
with a dual role as an anti-satellite and [an ABM] system while nominally classifying them as anti-
satellites only.
Note, supra note 24, at 351.
In other words, an anti-satellite weapon with actual or perceived ABM capabilities threatens the
mutual vulnerability underlying MAD as much as an ABM system. Restricting anti-satellite weapons
within the framework of the ABM Treaty, therefore, would represent an important step towards
achieving the doctrinal goals of MAD. Unfortunately, such specific suggestions for revision are beyond
the scope of this Comment.
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(b) ABM launchers,
(c) ABM radars, ..
3. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 2 of this Article
include those which are:
(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.
4. The definition of an ABM system provided in paragraph 1 is functional
in effect and includes ABM systems and components based on other physical
principles capable of substituting for or superceding ABM interceptor mis-
siles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars.
The first significant revision to Article II is the substitution of a period for
the comma at the end of the first clause in the first paragraph. As revised,
paragraph one defines an ABM system strictly on a functional basis.
Paragraphs two and three of the revised article serve an illustrative purpose.
That is, they describe what an ABM system and its elements consisted of in
1972. The punctuation change in paragraph one effectively eliminates the
argument that an ABM system is one that serves the functions described
and that consists of the type of components that existed "currently," or at
the time of the Treaty's signing. To be certain that an illustrative interpreta-
tion is given Article II, however, paragraph four is added clearly to include
"exotic" ABM systems and components within the limitations of the
Treaty. Finally, since the purpose of Agreed Interpretation [D] is pre-
empted by paragraph four, that statement should be eliminated, thereby
removing a significant source of confusion and ambiguity. Through these
suggested revisions to Article II, the ABM Treaty would be made to serve
more efficiently its purpose of limiting defensive capabilities within the
strategic policy of Mutual Assured Destruction.
B. Article V
Article V(1) of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and
deployment of ABM systems and components which are not fixed, land-
based weapons. As such, it is the key obstacle to the testing and develop-
ment of defensive systems in the proposed SDI projects. Article V(1) reads
as follows:
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-
based.
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Article V(2), in contrast, establishes limits on the development, testing,
and deployment of fixed, land-based ABMs permitted under Article III.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for
launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each
launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a
capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or
other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.
Agreed Interpretation [E], which should be read in conjunction with
paragraph 2 of Article V, also delineates limits on fixed, land-based
defensive systems:
The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not
to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each
ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.
Article V(2) and Agreed Interpretation [E] represent a compromise
between the desire to limit defensive capabilites and the need to ensure that
each country is protected from a sudden "breakout" in which the opposing
state rapidly deploys a sophisticated ABM system which threatens or
eliminates the mutual vulnerability of the superpowers. 72 Continued re-
search, development, and deployment of fixed, land-based ABM systems
protect against such a breakout by ensuring that each country will not fall
so far behind the other that the mutual vulnerability underlying MAD could
be eliminated. For this reason, paragraph 1 does not prohibit the develop-
ment, testing, or deployment of fixed, land-based ABM systems, and
Article I describes the deployments permissible under the Treaty for
achieving this protective purpose.73
The debate over the interpretation of Article V(1) is in large part
connected to the dispute over the meaning of Article II. The principal
position of the supporters of MAD is that because Article V(1) prohibits the
testing of all ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based, only fixed land-based systems and
72. S.A.L.A., supra note 2, at 9 (statement of William P. Rogers, Secretary of State).
73. Id. at 31 (insertion in the record of The Arms Accord: Everyone Gains, Washington Post, June
4, 1972). Article II originally allowed each superpower to deploy one hundred ABM launchers in each
of two sites-one around the national capital and one around a missile field. Article I of the Protocol to
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, however, further limited the permissible
deployment areas to only one of the two sites allowed in Article HI of the ABM Treaty. INTERNATioNAL
ARMs CONTROL: Issues AND AGREEMENTS 388 (J. Barton & L. Weiler 1976). The Soviet Union has its
permitted system around Moscow. The United States at one point had a system around a missile field,
but it was dismantled and no replacement was deployed.
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components may be developed and tested. 74 Indeed, through 1985, even the
Reagan Administration agreed with this position. 75
The proponents of SDI, however, have since taken a new interpretative
tack based on a conjunctive reading of Article II arguably supported by
Agreed Interpretation [D] which limits the definition of ABM systems to
those consisting of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM
radars. Whether this new interpretation is fully justified is, of course, the
subject of much debate. 76 For the purposes of this section of this Comment,
however, the question is moot, for it is assumed that Article II has been
revised and Agreed Interpretation [D] eliminated to remove the possibility
of a conjunctive, limited reading of the scope of an "ABM system." With
the elimination of this reading, Article V(l) clearly would restrict all
development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components to
those which are land-based and fixed. This settled, the ambiguities and
loopholes within Article V which weaken the ABM Treaty, regardless of
the interpretation given Article II, can be examined.
1. The Ambiguities and Loopholes of Article V
The Reagan Administration intends to carry out some fifteen SDI tests or
experiments through fiscal year 1988, all purportedly in compliance with
the Treaty, and all without the broad interpretation of Article 11. 77 Each of
these tests or experiments is justified by placing it in one of three catego-
ries: One, research; two, development of "subcomponents"; or three, anti-
satellite weapons testing.78 While all three of these categories are of
concern, a discussion of anti-satellite weapons is beyond the scope of this
Comment. 79 Resolving the difficulties presented by "research" and "sub-
components," however, should ensure that the purpose of the Treaty under
MAD is not frustrated.
74. Sofaer, supra note 63, at 1973.
75. Since 1978, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been required by law to prepare an
annual Arms Control Impact Statement for presentation to Congress. Through fiscal year 1985 each of
these statements, without exception, explicitly endorsed the traditional interpretation. The latest such
statement for fiscal 1985 says: "The ABM Treaty prohibition on development, testing and deployment
of space-based ABM systems, or components for such systems, applies to directed energy technology
(or any other technology) used for this purpose." Chayes, supra note 63, at 1968-69.
76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
77. Chayes, supra note 63, at 1969.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 71.
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a. Research
Fundamental research is currently allowed within the Treaty framework,
as it should continue to be. The word "research" does not appear in the text
of the ABM Treaty or in its agreed interpretations. It follows that research
into any ABM system, whether it be land-based, sea-based, air-based, or
space-based, is not restricted by the 1972 Treaty. Such general research, as
well as development, testing, and deployment of fixed land-based ABM
systems in accordance with Articles III, IV, V, and VII of the Treaty, is
permitted as a hedge against the possible breakout by one of the signatories
from the Treaty.
Permitting general research also avoids the difficult problems which
would arise in verifying any attempted ban of this type of activity. Allowing
research, however, does not solve the conundrum of deciding where to
draw the line between lawful research and forbidden or restricted "develop-
ment" in any given situation. 80 Perhaps the best way to deal with the
possible danger of restricted development being passed off as permissible
"research" is to draw the line at the point where verification does become
possible. Any activity below this line would be allowed and everything
above it forbidden, regardless of the technological stage of the given
project. 81 Beyond this effort to distinguish between verifiable and non-
verifiable activities, the best way to deal with the inherently ambiguous
term "research" appears to be to leave it alone. Instead, the focus of
attention should be directed to the parts of the Treaty which can be revised
or defined to meet the purposes of the strategic policy of MAD.
80. A good example of the difficulty in drawing the line between research and development took
place at the Reykjavik Summit on October 11 and 12, 1986. Secretary of State Shultz, commenting on
the results of the summit, said that "the tentative package of 'extremely important potential agree-
ments,' extending into areas other than arms control, failed when Mr. Gorbachev insisted that the 1972
treaty limiting defensive missiles. . be changed to prevent research, testing and development of the
proposed [SDI] defenses beyond the laboratory." Reagan-Gorbachev Talks End in Stalemate as U.S.
Rejects Demand to Curb "Star Wars," N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.). This proposal
to limit research to the laboratory is widely credited with scuttling the prospective Iceland agreements.
Id.; Gorbachev Angrily Makes Charge that Reagan 'Scuttled' Accords, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1986, at
7, col. 5 (nat'l ed.); So Near and Yet, Alas, so Confoundedly Far, Economist, Oct. 18, 1986, at 19.
81. Since the capabilities of our national means of verification are a well-kept secret, it is beyond
the scope of this Comment to suggest where this "line" of verification exists. The line's location will
have to be determined by mutual agreement between the USA and the USSR if and when they meet to
revise the ABM Treaty. See S.A.L.A., supra note 2, at 222 (Dr. Edward Teller's opinion that this
secrecy is "highly improper"); id. at 57 (notice of Director of Intelligence Helm's testimony on
verification, which was delivered in a secret session of the committee and not entered into the public
record).
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b. Subcomponents
Article V(1) currently forbids the development, testing, or deployment
of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based. "Subcomponents" are not mentioned in the
article and, like "research," are not subject to the limitations of the Treaty.
This exclusion can seemingly be justified as another means for hedging
against a possible breakout by one of the signatories. Development and
testing of subcomponents for other than fixed, land-based ABMs, however,
could easily become destabilizing by actually increasing the chances of a
sudden deployment of defensive weapon systems.
By permitting the development and testing of subcomponents for sea-
based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABMs, the Treaty's
ability to fulfill its intended role in the MAD strategy is weakened in three
ways. First, the parties can easily avoid Treaty obligations by disguising
restricted components as permissible "subcomponents." The possibility of
this occurring is likely to increase, for the unknown nature of exotic-
technology weapons may mask their strategic role.
Second, a wide-ranging development and testing program of all possible
types of ABM technology is more likely to produce a weapon system which
actually works to some degree, especially if new varieties of weapon
components are passed off as subcomponents. If a successful system is
produced, the chances of a breakout from the Treaty through deployment
will undoubtedly increase.
Third, as the possibility of the development of a successful defensive
system increases, so does the perceived need for more offensive arms. This
perception would not be eliminated simply because a complete component
had not yet been tested. In short, the fact that "subcomponents" slip
through the cracks of Article V harms the Treaty's ability to fulfill its
purpose of preventing an arms race. The Treaty, therefore, should be
revised to preclude the development and testing of subcomponents.
2. Article V (Revised)
The following suggested revisions to Article V are intended to prevent
the development and testing of "subcomponents" of sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and to update the Article
so as to include clearly within its terms exotic weapon systems.
Article V (Revised)
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems,
components, or elements which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or
mobile land-based.
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(a) An ABM system consists of one or more components, the components
listed in paragraph 2 of Article II being illustrative of what can constitute an
ABM system.
(b) An ABM component consists of two or more elements, said elements
each fulfilling a distinctly separate function, and without which elements said
component could not perform its mission within the ABM system.
(c) An ABM element consists of two or more sub-elements, said sub-
elements combining to perform the distinct function of that element within
the ABM component.
(1) An ABM element, if deployed separately from its co-element(s), will
not function either independently of or in conjunction with components of an
ABM system.
(2) ABM sub-elements are not subject to the limitations of this Treaty on
development and testing.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers or
their functional equivalents for launching more than one ABM interceptor
missile or its functional equivalent at a time from each such launcher, or to
modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, or to
develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems
for rapid reload of ABM launchers or their functional equivalents.
(a) Each Party understands that paragraph 2 of .this Article includes
obligations not to develop, test, or deploy ABM interceptor missiles or their
functional equivalents for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile or its
functional equivalent of more than one independently guided warhead or
destructive device.
a. Article V(1) (Revised)
The major revision needed within the article is to bring subcomponents
within the terms of the Treaty. The term "subcomponents," however,
remains absent from the revised article. Rather, the term "elements" was
used to maintain consistency of terminology within the Treaty itself.
Article II(1) states that "an ABM system is a system to counter strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory." 82 The elements of
strategic ballistic missiles consist, among other things, of one or more
warheads, a "bus" which deploys each warhead at the appropriate mo-
ment, a guidance system, rocket engines, and so on. Similarly, an ABM
interceptor missile consists of a warhead or other destructive device, a
guidance system, rocket engines, and whatever else it takes for the missile
to operate successfully. These items are referred to as "subcomponents" by
82. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11(1) (emphasis added).
787
Washington Law Review
the Department of Defense, 83 but clearly they are comparable to the
"elements" of a strategic ballistic missile. Therefore, in order to avoid
confusion and maintain consistency within the revised Treaty itself, the
term "elements" has been used instead of the word "subcomponents."
Any hard and fast definition of an "element" is likely to become obsolete
as the state of technology advances. Because of this possible effect, the
word has been defined in terms of its relationship to the other functional
words of the Treaty. To illustrate, an "element" consists of two or more
"sub-elements," a "component" consists of two or more "elements," and
an "ABM system" consists of one or more "components." Each functional
item except a system requires two or more lower-level items to perform its
military purpose. 84 Thus, if one purported "sub-element" alone can serve a
distinctly separate function within an ABM component, it is actually an
element as defined within Article V(1)(c) and subject to the limitations of
the Treaty.
According to the terms of Article V as revised, only sub-elements are
exempt from the ABM Treaty's limitations on development and testing.
This definitional approach is used because it should prevent a signatory
from passing off something as a "sub-element" when its functional pur-
pose is actually greater than that of a sub-element. The general strategic
effect of this definitional framework is to reduce the fears of a "breakout"
by bringing questionable development and testing activities of the signato-
ries within the limitations of the ABM Treaty. This inclusion of question-
able activities makes any violation occur earlier in the development pro-
cess, thereby giving the opposing country more time to respond to the
threat of a possible breakout. In short, revised Article V strengthens MAD
by making the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-
based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems more difficult to
achieve.
b. Article V(2) (Revised)
Paragraph 2 of Article V, as revised, reads as follows: "Each Party
undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers or their func-
tional equivalents for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile or
its functional equivalent at a time from each such launcher . . . ." This
revision recognizes that with the advent of ABM systems based on exotic
83. Chayes, supra note 63, at 1969.
84. A component is exempt from the "upward mobility" created by the definitional framework in
Article V because it is conceivable that technology could advance to the point where all functions
needed for an effective ABM system could be combined in a single "item." At such a point, the
component would be synonymous with an ABM system.
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technologies, such as lasers, the device which actually launches or inter-
cepts and destroys the incoming warhead may not be described by its
traditional term. A prohibition against a "functional equivalent," there-
fore, brings this paragraph into conformity with the general aims of the
revised Treaty.
The final revision to Article V is the addition of subsection (a) to
paragraph 2. Article V(2)(a) is essentially Agreed Interpretation [E], with
the addition of "functional equivalent" language to include exotic weapons
systems. Under Agreed Interpretation [E] the parties are obligated not to
develop, test, or deploy ABM interceptor missiles with more than one
independently guided warhead. As such it is consistent with the assump-
tions of MAD and should be incorporated in the text of the Treaty.
C. The Political Hurdles to Treaty Revision
Like the option of terminating the ABM Treaty to pursue SDI, a decision
to strengthen the Treaty through revision would encounter domestic and
international political obstacles to its implementation. The key domestic
factor in the United States is President Reagan's refusal to compromise the
Strategic Defense Initiative.85 Given President Reagan's position, it is safe
to conclude that any strengthening of the terms of the ABM Treaty will have
to wait at least until the next administration takes office in 1989.
Another uncertainty is whether there is sufficient domestic support in the
Soviet Union for a strengthening of the terms of the ABM Treaty. Publicly,
the Soviets have advocated a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty which
would limit SDI research to the "laboratory" for at least the next ten
years. 86 Since the ABM Treaty itself does not restrict research to the
laboratory, the Soviet position implies a willingness to negotiate stronger
provisions for the Treaty. The possibility must be considered, however, that
the Soviet position is not sincere and that it is merely intended to gain a
propoganda victory for Russia.87 If this is the case, the Soviets could easily
rely on the passage of a couple of years to permit a change in their position
which would preclude any negotiated reinforcement of the Treaty.
85. See Reagan Says Soviet Barred Accord on Arms Reduction, but Offers to Renew Talks, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
86. See id. at 4, col. 2; U.S. Said to NearRuling on Meaning of '72 ABM Treaty, N.Y. Times, Feb.
5, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
87. SeeRussiansSee Fertile GroundforBroadDiplomatic Gains, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14,1986, at6,
col. I (nat'l ed.), for a clear acknowledgment by Soviet officials of the political advantage of making
President Reagan appear to be the major stumbling block to an arms control agreement. Given this
acknowledgment, it is certainly possible that propaganda goals were the primary motivating factor of
the Soviets at the recent summit in Iceland.
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If these respective domestic hurdles are overcome, the superpowers
would still face the arduous task of hammering out mutually agreeable
revisions to the Treaty. Revisions along the lines of those suggested above,
however, should be acceptable to both nations if they are serious about
strengthening prohibitions against defensive weapon systems.
IV. CONCLUSION
The temptation to try to rely on MAD and pursue SDI at the same time is
difficult to resist. Indeed, this is precisely what the Reagan Administration
is attempting to do. The underlying contradictory premises of the two
doctrines, however, make the simultaneous maintenance of their strategic
purposes difficult or impossible to achieve. As this Comment demon-
strates, therefore, a choice between the two must be made. In an effort to
aid this choice, this Comment sets forth some of the strengths and weak-
nesses of both SDI and MAD and suggests methods to terminate or revise
the ABM Treaty to conform with each doctrine respectively.
William A. Kinsel
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